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ABSTRACT
We show a statistically significant and economically relevant effect of open capital accounts on
financial deepness and economic growth in a cross-section of countries over the period 1986 to 1995.
Countries with open capital accounts over some or all of this period had a significantly greater
increase in financial depth than countries with continuing capital account restrictions, and they also
enjoyed greater economic growth.  The results, however, are largely driven by the developed
countries in the sample.  The observed failure of capital account liberalization to promote financial
deepness among developing countries suggests potentially important policy implications concerning
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1. Introduction 
  By the end of the twentieth century, governments of industrial countries had 
virtually eliminated all policies hindering the movement of financial capital across their 
borders. Basic economic theory suggests ways in which capital account liberalization 
may benefit a country: Free capital mobility offers the opportunity to realize the highest 
return on saving, to borrow at the most favorable rates, and to diversify away country-
specific risk.
1 A more subtle set of benefits, but ones that have increasingly been the 
focus of discussion, pertain to the impact of capital account liberalization on the 
efficiency and development of a country’s financial system. The potential relevance of 
this channel is highlighted by recent work on the importance of financial development for 
economic growth.
2   
  There are a number of channels through which capital account liberalization can 
contribute to the development of a country’s financial system. Exposure to international 
competition may improve the efficiency of the domestic financial system via the 
introduction of international standards as well as through the potential threat of “flight to 
quality” posed by foreign intermediaries. Subsidiaries or branches of foreign banks may 
enlarge the absolute size of the national banking system, serve formerly neglected niches 
of the market, and introduce financial innovation that directly broadens the scope of 
financial services. These gains in the efficiency and scope of the financial sector may 
                                                 
1 Two surveys of the empirical literature on the role of capital account liberalization on growth 
are Edison, Klein, Ricci and Sløk (2004) and Prasad, Rogoff, Wei and Kose (2003).   
 
2 Empirical studies documenting the contributions of financial intermediaries to economic growth 
include McKinnon (1973), King and Levine (1993), Rajan and Zingales (1998), and Levine, 
Loayza, and Beck (2000). See also the review paper by Levine (1997). The theoretical 
foundations of financial intermediation’s role in economic development are discussed by, among 
others, Bagehot (1873), Schumpeter (1912), Hicks (1969), Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) and 
Bencivenga and Smith (1991).       2 
increase the pool of available savings both by eliciting higher domestically generated 
savings and by promoting capital inflows. And, in a virtuous cycle, increased savings 
may in turn promote further efficiency by enabling intermediaries to reap significant 
economies of scale and scope.
3  
  In this paper we examine whether there is evidence of a link from capital account 
liberalization to financial depth and, through this channel, to overall economic growth.
4  
Using a wide cross-section of countries, we show that countries with open capital 
accounts have significantly greater financial depth than countries with capital account 
restrictions. Estimates indicate an economically important and statistically significant 
effect of capital account liberalization on economic growth through the deepening of a 
country’s financial market. We also show, however, that the significance of the link 
between capital account convertibility and financial depth seems to be driven largely by 
the industrialized countries included in the cross-section. Therefore, one possible 
interpretation of our findings is that countries require a constellation of economic, legal, 
and social institutions in order to have capital account liberalization translate into greater 
                                                 
3 See de Swaan (1999). Addressing these points, Summers (2000) writes: “…to the extent that 
international financial integration represents an improvement in financial intermediation, … 
[perhaps] because institutions involved in the transfer of capital across jurisdictions improve 
efficiency with which capital is allocated, it offers a potentially significant increase in economic 
efficiency. …[F]inancial flows …finance real trade, … provide capital to local businesses on 
what are often the best available terms … [and] are closely associated with the presence of 
foreign businesses and foreign financial institutions, which themselves bring significant benefits.” 
(p. 3) 
 
4  Two works related to ours include De Gregorio (1999) and Chinn and Ito (2002). De Gregorio 
analyzes the effect of financial integration on financial depth and, through this channel, on overall 
growth. Our study differs from his in that we use a wider set of countries, a different measure of 
financial integration, and a different empirical specification. Chinn and Ito’s empirical analysis of 
the effect of capital account liberalization on financial development is similar to ours. We differ 
by using a pure cross-sectional approach, whereas Chinn and Ito rely on panel data techniques.    3 
financial depth.
5  These institutions tend to be present in industrial countries but are less 
common among developing countries. 
  The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the data used in the 
empirical analysis. Section 3 examines the effect of capital account liberalization on 
financial depth in a wide cross-section of developed and developing countries. Section 4 
assesses the impact of capital account liberalization on overall economic growth through 
the financial deepening channel by estimating a simultaneous equation model in which 
financial depth and economic growth are jointly determined. Section 5 offers some 
concluding remarks.  
 
2. Measures of Financial Depth and Capital Account Liberalization  
  It is difficult to construct a single quantitative measure that captures the extent to 
which financial markets in a country fulfill their potential roles, a difficulty compounded 
when studying a widely heterogeneous set of countries. Likewise, there are several ways 
to gauge the ease with which assets are traded across a country’s border. Our indicators 
of financial depth and capital account liberalization largely follow those used in previous 
research. Descriptive statistics of these data, presented in this section, foreshadow some 
of the themes raised in the regression analysis, including differences between industrial 
and developing countries and patterns of capital account liberalization. 
Financial Depth  
  Several measures of financial development have been proposed in the empirical 
literature. In our work, we focus on two indicators of financial intermediary development, 
                                                 
5 The need for the presence of well-functioning economic, social, and legal institutions in order to 
reap the benefits from opening an economy has been stressed by, among others, Rodrik (1999) 
and Klein (2005).   4 
with each indicator constructed in such a way that an increase reflects greater financial 
depth.
6  
The liquid liabilities indicator, LLY, represents the ratio of liquid liabilities to 
GDP, where liquid liabilities consist of currency held outside the banking system plus 
demand and interest-bearing liabilities of banks and non-bank financial intermediaries. 
Thus, LLY is a typical measure of financial depth since it reflects the overall size of the 
financial intermediary sector. It does not, however, distinguish between the allocation of 
capital to the private sector and to various governmental and quasi-governmental 
agencies. In an effort to isolate credit issued to the private sector from that issued to 
governments, government agencies, and public enterprises, we also employ the indicator 
PRIVY, which equals the ratio of claims by financial intermediaries to the private sector 
to GDP. Typically, this is the indicator of financial development preferred in the 
empirical literature.
7 
  We will study the effect of capital account liberalization over the period 1986 to 
1995, and over the period 1975 to 1995, on a country’s average level of financial depth 
during the years 1991-1995. We focus on this average level rather than the measured 
level of financial depth in 1995, the last year of our sample, in order to minimize random 
variations in our indicators of financial depth.
8 
                                                 
6 It is plausible, at least in principle, that financial integration has an impact not only on the 
development of financial intermediaries, but also on the development of a country's stock and 
bond market (Levine and Zervos 1998). We limit our analysis to indicators of financial 
intermediary development since this allows us to consider a wider set of countries. 
 
7 See, for example, Levine, Loayza and Beck (2000).   
 
8 As we explain later in the text, the sample ends in 1995 because the measurement of our 
indicator of capital account openness changed after this date in a way that makes the post-1995   5 
  Table 1 presents summary statistics on LLY and PRIVY, both for the full sample 
of countries and for the separate samples of industrial and developing countries.
9 The 
correlation between these two indicators is greater than 70 percent for both OECD and 
non-OECD samples. Both measures of financial development indicate greater financial 
depth among the 21 OECD countries than among the 74 non-OECD countries in our 
sample. In addition, while the OECD countries experienced sizable financial deepening 
over the period 1986 to 1995, there were much smaller increases in both measures of 
financial depth among the countries that constitute the non-OECD sample. In contrast, 
non-OECD countries experienced a faster rate of financial deepening over the previous 
decade, 1976 to 1986, than did the OECD countries. This difference in the time-series 
evolution of our indicators of financial depth is one reason for assessing the effect of 
capital account liberalization on financial deepening over different sample periods.
10 
Capital Account Liberalization 
  Given the diversity in the intensity and scope of capital controls, it is difficult to 
obtain a consistent measure of capital account restrictions across a wide range of 
countries. We follow the majority of studies on capital account liberalization in using 
annual data from the International Monetary Fund’s publication Exchange Arrangements 
                                                                                                                                                 
values of this series incommensurate with the earlier values. Furthermore, the rise of emerging 
markets in the early 1990s makes this period a focus of interest. 
 
9 In this paper, OECD member countries are those that were in the OECD in 1986. The appendix 
includes the list of countries and notes those that are classified as OECD members as well as 
those that, for reasons of data availability, are not included in the 1976 – 1995 sample but only in 
the shorter 1986 – 1995 sample.  
 
10 The results discussed here are robust to using the same sample for the shorter period as is 
available for the longer period. 
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and Exchange Restrictions.
11  One advantage of these data is that they provide a 
consistent measure over a wide range of countries. Another advantage is that they are 
available on an annual basis. Their major disadvantage is that, until 1996, they provided 
only the broadest indication of a country’s stance towards the free movement of capital. 
The indicators before 1996 did not distinguish between restrictions on different types of 
capital flows or even between restrictions on inflows of capital and restrictions on 
outflows of capital. The more recent (from 1996 on) IMF data include greater detail, but 
it is still impossible to directly measure the intensity of controls or their efficacy. Also, 
because we cannot reliably map the new classification system into a qualitative set of 
indicators that matches the older classification system, our empirical analysis focuses on 
the pre-1996 period. 
  From the Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions we generate a 
simple 0/1 indicator variable for each country for each year.
12 This indicator takes the 
value of 1 if the country had no capital controls in place. Then, for each country, we 
calculate the variable KALIB, which represents the proportion of years in which the 
country had unrestricted capital mobility. This method of taking the share of years over a 
period during which the capital account was open has been used by Grilli and Milesi-
Ferretti (1995), Rodrik (1998), and Klein (2005), among others. 
  Panel A of Table 2 lists the value of KALIB86-95  for countries included in next 
section’s regression analysis that had some experience with open capital accounts (that is, 
                                                 
11 Edison, Klein, Sløk and Ricci (2004) show that there is a high correlation between the indicator 
of capital account openness used in this paper and the one developed by Dennis Quinn (1997), 
which is the other indicator most often used in empirical analysis.  The Quinn indicator is 
available for a smaller set of countries than the indicator used in this paper. 
 
12 The appropriate information is in line E2 in the Summary Table of Exchange Arrangements 
and Exchange Restrictions.   7 
KALIB86-95  ? 0) over the period 1986 to 1995. This panel shows that KALIB86-95  equals 1 
for 9 OECD countries (out of a possible 21) and 7 non-OECD countries (out of a possible 
74). While 58 non-OECD countries had restricted capital account for this entire period, 
the same is true for only 2 OECD countries, Greece and Iceland. 
  While the definition of KALIB does not necessarily reflect the timing of capital 
account liberalization, the data in the table nonetheless show a correspondence between 
KALIB86-95 and the actual years during which the capital account was open. For example, 
all the countries for which KALIB86-95   = 0.1 had open capital markets in 1995 only; the 
countries for which KALIB86-95  = 0.2 had open capital markets in 1994 and 1995; the 
countries for which KALIB86-95  = 0.3 had open capital markets in 1993 to 1995; and so 
on. This relationship generally holds across all values of KALIB86-95  with only two cases 
of on-again, off-again capital account liberalization, Ecuador and Uruguay. 
   Panel B of Table 2 shows that there were also no instances of on-again, off-again 
capital account liberalization for OECD countries if we extend the sample period back to 
1976. However, 10 of the 18 non-OECD countries that had some experience with 
liberalized capital accounts in the period between 1976 and 1984, reimposed restrictions 
at some time over the sample period.
13 Thus, for non-OECD countries, there is a weaker 
correspondence between the timing of capital account liberalization and the twenty-year 
indicator, KALIB76-95  than is the case with the indicator based on the shorter sample 
period, KALIB86-95.  Because of this weaker correspondence, in the next section we 
present regression results for the 1986 to 1995 sample period, as well as for the twenty-
year sample. 
                                                 
13 The five non-OECD countries that had continuously open capital accounts over the period 1976 
to 1995 are Bahrain, Indonesia, Malaysia, Panama, and Saudi Arabia. 
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3. Capital Account Liberalization and Financial Depth 
  In this section we provide evidence of a systematic association between capital 
account liberalization and financial depth, and show that such a result is robust to 
different estimation techniques, to changes in the sample period, and to the inclusion of 
variables controlling for other types of policy changes or cross-country differences in 
institutional factors. However, we also show that the findings are largely driven by the 
responsiveness of financial depth to capital account liberalization among OECD 
countries.  
 
Specification and Basic Results 
  Financial depth is typically used as an exogenous regressor to explain economic 
growth. The focus of this section, however, is to explain the determinants of financial 
depth. In the absence of a theoretical model that offers a clear explanation of these 
determinants, but with a focus on the possible role of capital account liberalization on 
promoting financial depth, we use the following specification of the determinants of the 
average level of financial depth in a country over the period 1991 to 1995,  




s KALIB FD e b b b + + + = X 2 1 0 1990       (1)    
where, 
i
s FD1990  is country i’s measure of average financial depth for the period 1991 to 
1995 (that is, 
i
s LLY1990  or 
i
s PRIVY1990 ), 
i
j KALIB  indicates country i’s stance in terms of 
capital account liberalization over the period j, where j is either the period 1976 to 1995, 
or the period 1986 to 1995, 
i X  represents a vector of other explanatory variables, and 
i e  
is an error term. In our simplest specification, the vector of controls 
i X  includes indicator   9 
variables for the regions of Africa and Latin America and an indicator variable 
identifying oil producing nations, Oil.
14  The vector 
i X  also includes the variable Tradek, 
representing the ratio of the sum of a country’s exports plus imports to its national 
income for either k = 1976 (for the regressions that cover the period 1976 to 1995) or  
k = 1986 (for the 1986 to 1995 sample). We include the initial level of trade as a control 
in the regression because trade may be positively associated with both financial depth 
(high openness to trade may require a more developed financial system) and an open 
capital account (international financial flows may finance real trade). Moreover, there is a 
range of other country-specific factors that likely influences financial depth. In an effort 
to address the possibility of omitted variable bias, we include financial depth at the 
beginning of the period (that is, either 
i LLY1976  or 
i PRIVY1976 for the 1976 to 1995 sample, 
or 
i LLY1986  or 
i PRIVY1986 for the 1986 to 1995 sample) as an additional control in 
i X . 
  Results based on this core specification are presented in Table 3. Columns 1 and 2 
report OLS estimates using the 1986 to 1995 sample, for the regressions using LLY and 
PRIVY, respectively, while Columns 3 and 4 present OLS estimates that use the 1976 to 
1995 sample for these two measures of financial depth. The estimates in the table show a 
positive relationship between a country’s degree capital account openness and its level of 
financial development. In each of the regressions, the coefficient on KALIB is positive 
and significant at better than the 98 percent level of confidence. This influence of capital 
account liberalization on financial depth occurs while controlling for the initial level of 
                                                 
14 The eight oil-producing countries in our sample are Algeria, Bahrain, Republic of Congo, 
Gabon, Indonesia, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela. 
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financial depth, which is itself a significant determinant of the average level of financial 
depth in the first half of the 1990s. 
  One way to gauge the magnitude of the effect of capital account liberalization on 
financial depth is to consider the estimated difference in financial depth between a 
country that had a closed capital account throughout the period and one that had an open 
capital account, holding constant the other variables included in the regression. For 
example, the estimated difference in 
i
s PRIVY1990  for a country that had an open capital 
account, as compared to one that had a closed capital account throughout the period, 
ceteris paribus, is 0.126. This represents the difference between a country at the median 
level of 
i
s PRIVY1990  and one at the 64
th percentile. A comparable calculation for 
i
s LLY1990 , 
using the estimates from the 1986 to 1995 sample, gives a difference between a country 
at the median level of 
i
s LLY1990  and one at the 61
st percentile. The estimates from the 
longer sample show an even larger gain for both indicators of financial depth.
15  
  We have shown in the previous section that virtually all OECD countries had 
some experience with capital account liberalization, but there is a relatively small number 
of non-OECD countries that liberalized their capital accounts at any time before 1995. 
The question thus arises as to whether the finding of a significant and sizable effect of 
capital account liberalization on financial depth reflects the influence of a restricted set of 
countries or rather a more general tendency in the entire cross-section. Therefore, we next 
investigate whether the responsiveness of financial depth to capital account liberalization 
differs between the 21 OECD-member countries and the other countries in the sample by 
                                                 
15 The results from the 1976 to 1995 sample show that the estimated difference attributable to 
having an open, rather than a closed, capital account moves a country from the median value of 
financial depth to the 64
th  percentile for LLY, and to the 71
st  percentile for PRIVY. 
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introducing an interaction term between 
i
j KALIB  and a dummy variable that equals 1 for 
each of the 21 OECD member countries. Results of this exercise are reported in Table 4.  
These results indicate that, indeed, it is the experience of the OECD countries that 
contributes to the significant effect of capital account liberalization on financial depth. 
The coefficient on 
i
j KALIB  itself is not significant at the 95 percent confidence level in 
any of the four regressions, while the sum of the coefficient on 
i
j KALIB  and the 
coefficient on the interaction between 
i
j KALIB  and the OECD dummy variable is 
significant at better than the 99 percent level of confidence in all four regressions 
reported in this table.
16   
  The statistically significant results for the OECD countries also are of a 
magnitude that gives them economic relevance. For example, Australia and Sweden had 
comparable levels of  financial depth in 1986, as measured by PRIVY86, which was 0.385 
for Australia and 0.391 for Sweden. Australia had an open capital account in every year 
of the decade 1986 to 1995 while the capital account of Sweden was only open over the 
final three years of this period. The predicted difference in 
i
s PRIVY1990  across these two 
countries is 0.285 ×(1 – 0.3) = 0.200, which is close to the actual difference of 0.210. 
  These results raise the question of what features enable OECD countries to benefit 
from an open capital account. One possibility is that higher institutional quality in the 
OECD countries contributes to the positive responsiveness of financial depth to capital 
                                                 
16 One potential explanation for the lack of significant results in the non-OECD subsample is that 
some of the countries had an on-again, off-again experience with capital account liberalization.  
While this could account for the findings for the 1976 to 1995 sample, we here note that omitting 
Ecuador and Uruguay (the only two countries with on-again, off-again liberalization in the post-
1985 period) from the 1986 to 1995 sample does not significantly alter the results reported in the 
first two columns of Table 4. 
   12 
account liberalization. To investigate this possibility, we modify our baseline 
specification by adding an indicator of a country’s institutional quality and an interaction 
term between this indicator and 
i
j KALIB  to the regressors. The indicator of institutional 
quality we use, labeled Govrep, is an index of the likelihood that a country’s government 
will not repudiate contracts.
17  The Govrep indicator has a range from 1 to 10, with larger 
numbers indicating a lower likelihood of contract repudiation (for our sample, the actual 
range is 2.68 to 9.77).  The average value of Govrep is 9.11 for the 21 OECD countries 
and 5.62 for the 50 non-OECD countries for which we have data.  
Regression results for this exercise are reported in Table 5. The bottom rows of 
this table present the estimated partial derivative of financial depth with respect to capital 
account liberalization for different percentiles in the distribution of Govrep.
18 These 
results provide support for the hypothesis that capital account liberalization is more likely 
to promote financial depth when in the presence of better institutional quality. In three of 
the four cases, capital account liberalization has a significant effect on financial depth at 
the 95 percent confidence level or better. This occurs at levels of institutional quality 
higher than 5.30 (for 
i
s PRIVY1990  in the 1986 to 1995 sample), 6.30 (for 
i
s PRIVY1990  in the 
1976 to 1995 sample), and 7.80 (for 
i
s LLY1990  in the 1976 to 1995 sample).
19  
                                                 
17 This series is published by the PRS group and is based on the work of Knack and Keefer 
(1995). 
 
18 The value of institutional quality at the given percentiles differs between the 1976 to 1995 and 
1986 to 1995 samples, and the values used in constructing the lower part of the table reflect the 
percentiles for the respective regression samples. 
 
19 In a related vein, Klein (2005) shows that the effect of capital account liberalization on growth 
depends upon institutional quality, with a significant and positive effect at higher (although not 
the highest) levels of institutional quality.   13 
  In summary, the baseline results presented in Table 3 of this section show a 
significant effect of capital account liberalization on financial depth. Further exploration, 
as shown by the estimates in Tables 4 and 5, indicates that this effect is concentrated 
among OECD countries, possibly because these countries enjoy better institutional 
quality than the other countries in the sample. Thus, these findings suggest that the 
benefits of capital account liberalization are not unconditional, but are likely to depend 
upon the environment in which the liberalization occurs. 
 
Robustness 
  We now examine the robustness of our basic findings with respect to potential 
endogeneity bias and omitted variable bias. Capital account convertibility is often seen as 
the logical culmination of developing a deep, mature, and efficient financial system. If 
this were the case, OLS estimates of  1 b  using specification (1) would bias the results 
toward finding a positive relationship between capital account liberalization and financial 
depth if countries experience a deepening of their financial system for reasons other than 
an open capital account while their governments also undertake capital account 
liberalization. Therefore, it is potentially important to instrument for our measure of 
capital account liberalization. In what follows, we present instrumental variables 
estimates of the effect of capital account liberalization on financial depth. We also 
present other estimates drawn from a specification that includes additional variables 
which are potentially important for the determination of financial depth and which might 
be correlated with capital account liberalization.      14 
  The estimates in Table 6 report the instrumental variable analogues to the OLS 




, , the fitted value from an OLS regression of 
i
j KALIB  on the chosen 
instrument and all the other explanatory variables included in equation (1). This fitted 
value is then used to evaluate the effect of capital account liberalization on financial 
depth by means of an OLS regression.
20 The instrument for 
i
j KALIB  is the simple 
average of an indicator of current account liberalization and an indicator of the 
requirement to surrender export proceeds, with this average representing the value of the 
indicators for the period 1979 to 1985 when j = 1986 to 1995, and the value of the 
indicators for the period 1972 to 1975 when j = 1976 to 1995.
 21 This instrument is 
always highly significant in the first-stage regressions, with t-statistics higher than 4. As 
mentioned in the previous paragraph, we would expect to see a smaller responsiveness of 
financial depth to capital account liberalization if endogeneity plagued our results. 
However, the instrumental variable estimates reported in the table offer evidence that this 
is not the case, since the estimated coefficients for the OECD countries tend to be larger 
than the corresponding OLS estimates. As is typically the case, the standard errors 
associated with instrumental variables estimates are larger than those obtained with OLS.  
                                                 
20 The standard errors for the estimates reported in Table 6 are too conservative because they d 
not take into account that 
i fit
j KALIB
, is estimated, and consequently measured with sampling 
error.  
 
21 The indicators for current account liberalization and the surrender of export proceeds are 
constructed as a share of the number of years considered, in the same fashion as the capital 
account liberalization measure. We generate a simple 0/1 indicator variable for each country for 
each year, according to whether the restrictions were in place or not. We use lines E1 and E4 
from the Summary Table of the IMF’s Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions.  
   15 
  Table 7 addresses concerns of potential omitted variable bias by extending the 
specification used in Table 4 with a range of additional variables appropriate for the 
sample period.  These variables include the logarithm of initial real per capita income 
(either  76 lnY  or  86 lnY ), the growth of income per capita over the sample period (either 
95 76 ln - D Y  or  95 86 ln - D Y ), the average inflation over the sample period (either  95 76- p  or 
95 86- p ), and three dummy variables related to legal origin, LegalGermany, LegalFrance, 
and LegalUK (thus, the omitted legal origin dummy variable is the one for Scandinavian 
origin). All of these variables are potentially correlated with the dependent variable in our 
regression. For example, previous research has indicated a link between inflation and 
financial development (Boyd, Levine and Smith 2001). Legal origin, as well, has been 
shown to be a determinant of financial development (LaPorta et al., 1997, 1998). 
Likewise, a country’s level of financial depth may depend on a country’s growth 
experience and development, with faster-growing or richer countries requiring a higher 
degree of financial intermediation.
22 Note, however, that omission of these variables will 
bias the estimate for  1 b  in equation (1) only to the extent that these variables exhibit a 
correlation with capital account liberalization.   
  The estimates presented in Table 7 show that, even with the inclusion of these 
additional variables, capital account liberalization retains its significant contribution to 
financial depth. The estimated effect of capital account liberalization on financial depth 
among the OECD countries is marginally smaller when the additional control variables 
are included in three of the four cases, but in all four instances the coefficients remain 
                                                 
22 This point will become important for the regressions presented in the next section, which draw 
a link from capital account liberalization to financial depth to economic growth. 
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significant at better than the 95 percent level of confidence. We also note that there is no 
consistent pattern in the statistical significance of any of the variables added to the 
specification in Table 7. For example, income growth is significant only for the 
regressions that cover the longer sample period while inflation is only significant for the 
regressions in which the dependent variable is LLY.    
  Overall, we find that the results of the previous section are robust to the 
modifications in the specification presented here. Capital account liberalization continues 
to have an important role in the determination of financial depth for the OECD countries 
included in the cross-section. We next turn to an analysis of the way in which capital 
account liberalization, by promoting financial deepening, contributes to economic 
growth. 
 
4. Capital Account Liberalization and Growth  
  So far, our results have established a link between capital account liberalization 
and financial depth, holding constant a range of other possible contributory factors.    
Ultimately, an important source of the interest in financial depth resides in its impact on 
economic growth. In this section, we quantify the contribution of capital account 
liberalization to economic growth through its effect on financial depth.  
  The specification we use draws on the results presented above concerning the 
effect of capital account liberalization on financial depth. The growth regression takes the 
form  
   
i i i i
s i
i
i u Y FD
Y
Y






” D - Z
 
3 76 2 1990 1 0
76
95
95 76 ln ln ln a a a a    (2)   17 
where 
i
j Y  represents real per capita income for country i in year j (j = 1976 or 1995), 
i Z  
includes Trade76, the log of secondary school enrollment in country i in 1976, School76, 
and regional dummy variables for East Asia and Africa. This growth equation is 
estimated jointly with an equation describing financial depth,  
     
i i i i
j
i
s Y KALIB FD e b b b b + D + + + = -95 76 3 2 1 0 1990 ln X .    (1') 
This is the same as equation (1) in the previous section, except for the fact that we allow 
for potential feedback from growth to financial depth by explicitly including 
i Y 95 76 ln - D  
among the regressors. As in the previous section, the vector 
i X  includes indicator 
variables for the regions of Africa, Latin America, and for oil-producing countries, in 
addition to the initial levels of trade and financial depth. The system of two equations, 
(1') and (2), is estimated using three-stage least squares. The results for the growth 
regression (2), with one set of estimates using LLY and the other using PRIVY as 
indicators of financial depth, are presented in panel A of Table 8.
23 Panel B of the table 
reports estimation results for the financial depth equation (1'), again for LLY and PRIVY 
respectively.   
  The results in Table 8 show that there is a significant and positive effect of 
financial depth on economic growth for the period 1976 to 1995 in this cross section of 
countries. This finding is consistent with previous empirical literature on the importance 
of the role of financial depth for economic growth (e.g. King and Levine 1992). But the 
focus here is on the effect of capital account liberalization on growth via financial 
deepening. From equations (2) and (1'), it is possible to see that this effect is given by 
                                                 
23 Data availability constrains us to 70 observations, rather than the 73 available when we only 
run the financial depth regressions over the 1976 to 1995 period.  
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). 1 /( 3 1 1 1 b a b - a  We then estimate that an increase in 
i KALIB 95 76-  from zero to the mean 
value in the sample of the non-zero observations of 0.40 would lead to a change in per 
capita income growth over the years 1976 to 1995 of approximately 3.0 percentage points 
when LLY is used as an indicator of financial depth, and to a change of 5.5 percentage 
points when PRIVY is used. The economic relevance of these estimates is evident when 
we compare them to the sample mean value of per capita income growth of  22.1  percent 
over the period.   
  Overall, the results in this section confirm an important link from financial 
development to economic growth. However, the results of the previous section suggest 
that capital account liberalization appears to positively affect financial depth, and 
therefore economic growth, only in the subsample of highly industrialized economies. 
Thus, the estimated economically sizable link from open capital account to increased 
growth is not as likely to be present for a less developed country, at least when such a 
link is presumed to work through an increase in financial depth.  
 
5.  Concluding Remarks 
  In this paper we have shown a statistically significant and economically relevant 
effect of open capital accounts on financial depth and economic growth in a cross-section 
of developed and developing countries over the periods 1986 to 1995 and 1976 to 1995. 
Countries with open capital accounts over some part or all of these periods enjoyed a 
significantly greater increase in financial depth than countries with continuing capital 
account restrictions.   19 
  We have also shown, however, that capital account liberalization may not provide 
the same benefits to all. In particular, the positive relationship between capital account 
liberalization and financial depth seems to be concentrated among highly developed 
countries. There is little evidence of capital account liberalization promoting financial 
depth outside of this group of countries. This may suggest that the benefits of capital 
account liberalization are only fully realized if this policy change occurs in the presence 
of adequate institutions and sound macroeconomic policies. A complete understanding of 
the importance of the policy, institutional, and economic environment that is required for 
successful liberalization and integration into the world economy, however, calls for a 
more complete understanding of the manner in which openness alters the performance of 
an economy. 
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Data Appendix 
  The source for the financial indicators LLY  and PRIVY is Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, 




  The source for  
i KALIB 1995 1976-  and 
i KALIB 1995 1986- is the IMF Exchange 
Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (various issues). Section 2 in the text provides 
details on how these variables are constructed. 
  The level and growth rate of per capita GDP, the ratio of the sum of imports and 
exports to GDP, and secondary school enrollment come from the World Bank World 
Development Indicators (2000). The source for the variable measuring the degree to 
which governments do not repudiate contracts,  GovRep, is Knack and Keefer (1995) 
from the International Country Risk Guide. 
  The following is a list of countries included in the empirical analysis of Sections 3 
and 4 (with country codes in parentheses). Countries that are not members of the OECD 
as of 1986 are grouped by region (Continental Africa, Middle East, East Asia, South 
Asia, and Western Hemisphere, respectively), while the last group lists OECD member 
countries:  
  Africa (sub-Saharan): Burkina Faso, Central African Republic, Cote d'Ivoire, 
Cameroon, The Congo, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, 
Mauritania, Mauritius, Malawi, Niger, Nigeria, Sudan, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Swaziland, 
Chad, Togo, Uganda, South Africa, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Zambia.  
  Middle East: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Syria.  
  South Asia: Bangladesh, India, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Pakistan.  
  East Asia: Fiji, Indonesia, Republic of   Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, 
Samoa.  
  Latin America: Argentina, Bahamas, Bolivia, Brazil, Barbados, Chile, Costa Rica, 
Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, 
Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Paraguay, El Salvador, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, St. 
Vincent and the Grenadines, Venezuela. 
  OECD members: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, 








Financial Depth: Summary Statistics 
 
 
A.  LLY - Liquid Liabilities as a Ratio of GDP 
  LLY76   LLY86  LLY1990s 
Percent Change 
1976 – 1995  
Percent Change 
1986 – 1995 






























      
 
 
B. PRIVY - Financial Intermediaries’ Private Sector Claims as a Ratio of GDP 
  PRIVY76  PRIVY76  PRIVY1990s  Percent Change 
1976 – 1995 
Percent Change 
1986 – 1995  

































Note: LLY1990s and PRIVY1990s denote average values for the period 1991-1995. Samples sizes are in parentheses. 
       
 Table 2 
Capital Account Liberalization Index 
 
A.  KALIB86-95 and Years of Open Capital Markets (KALIB86-95 „ 0) 
KALIB86-95  Years Open  OECD Countries  Non-OECD Countries 
0.1  1995  Norway  Costa Rica, Niger 
0.2  1994-95  Spain  Trinidad & Tobago 
0.3  1993-95  Portugal, Sweden  Argentina, Honduras, Peru 
0.4  1992-95  Ireland   
0.5  1991-95  Finland, Austria   
1990-95  France, Italy    0.6 
1988-92, 1995    Ecuador 




0.8  1988-95  Denmark   
1.0  1986-95  Australia, Belgium, Canada, 
Germany, Japan, Netherlands,  
New Zealand, U.K., U.S. 
Bahrain, Bolivia, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Panama, Saudi 
Arabia, Singapore 
 
B.  The Evolution of Capital Account Restrictions, 1976-1984   
COUNTRIES WITH OPEN CAPITAL ACCOUNTS IN 1976 
  OECD Countries  Non-OECDCountries 
  Belgium, Canada, Germany, 
Netherlands, US 
Bahrain, Bolivia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, 
Indonesia, Iran, Malaysia, Mexico, Nicaragua, 
Panama, Venezuela, Saudi Arabia 
COUNTRIES CHANGING CAPITAL ACCOUNT RESTRICTIONS 
OECD Countries  Non-OECD Countries  Year 
Opening Cap. Account  Opening Cap. Account  Closing Cap. Account 
1978    Peru, Singapore, 
Uruguay  
Iran, Nicaragua  
1979  Japan, UK     
1980    Costa Rica  Guatemala, Honduras 
1981      Bolivia 
1982    Paraguay  Costa Rica, Mexico 
1984  Australia, New Zealand    Paraguay, Peru, 
Venezuela 
Source: IMF Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions, various issues.  
Table 3 



















Note: FD denotes the relevant measure of financial depth, LLY or PRIVY.  A constant is included in all the 
regressions. Standard error in parentheses. ** indicates significance at the 95 percent level of confidence.  
*** indicates significance at the 99 percent level of confidence.  
 
  1986 – 1995    1976-1995 
  (1)  (2)    (3)  (4) 
  LLY1990s  PRIVY1990s    LLY1990s  PRIVY1990s 
KALIB86-95       .0885*** 
(.0300) 
     .1258*** 
(.0379) 
KALIB76-95     .1040** 
(.0420) 
     .2670*** 
(.0577) 
FD86       .5907*** 
(.0564) 
     .8429*** 
(.0797) 
FD76       .5126*** 
(.0872) 
     .6547*** 
(.1170) 








Africa     -.1408*** 
(.0323) 
   -.0847** 
(.0380) 
Africa      -.2141*** 
(.0416) 
    -.1440*** 
(.0544) 




Latin America      -.1806*** 
(.0373) 
    -.1827*** 
(.0485) 
Oil      -.1424*** 
(.0379) 
    -.1831*** 
(.0465) 
Oil    -.1016** 
(.0450) 
    -.1680*** 
(.0609) 
Obs.  95  95  Obs.  73  73 
Adj. R
2  .83  .78  Adj. R
2  .77  .68  
Table 4 
Financial Depth and Capital Account Liberalization:  
Assessing the Experience of OECD Countries 
 
           


























        




Note: FD denotes the relevant measure of financial depth, LLY or PRIVY. A constant is included in all the regressions. 
Standard error in parentheses. * indicates significance at the 90 percent level of confidence. ** indicates significance at the 95 
percent level of confidence.  *** indicates significance at the 99 percent level of confidence.  
                                                                1986-1995                                                                                1976-1995 
                                                             (1)                (2)                                                                      (3)                  (4) 
  LLY1990s  PRIVY1990s    LLY1990s  PRIVY1990s 








FD86     .5873** 
(.0556) 
  .7313*** 
(.0797) 
FD76    .5861*** 
(.1001) 
  .5054*** 
(.1380) 








































KALIB86-95*OECD86      .1404** 
(.0708) 
  .2672*** 
(.0813) 




Obs.  95  95  Obs.  73  73 
Adj. R
2  .83  .81  Adj. R
2  .78  .69 









Financial Depth and Capital Account Liberalization:  



























     
 
 











Note: FD denotes the relevant measure of financial depth, LLY or PRIVY. A constant is included in all the regressions. Standard error in 
parentheses. * indicates significance at the 90 percent level of confidence. ** indicates significance at the 95 percent level of confidence.  
*** indicates significance at the 99 percent level of confidence.  
                                                                   1986-1995                                                                                   1976-1995 
                                                              (1)                 (2)                                                                            (3)                 (4) 
LLY1990s  PRIVY1990s    LLY1990s  PRIVY1990s 








FD86     .6114*** 
(.0703) 
   .6708*** 
(.0943) 
FD76     .4052*** 
(.1053) 
   .3644*** 
(.1347) 




















Latin America   -.1756*** 
(.0432) 
  -.1251** 
(.0538) 








Govrep  .0056 
(.0098) 
   .0275** 
(.0121) 
Govrep  .0012 
(.0121) 
   .0496*** 
(.0161) 








Obs.  71  71  Obs.  65  65 
Adj. R
2  .86  .84  Adj. R
2  .80  .75 
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th Percentile of Govrep  .0615 
(.0403) 
   .1409*** 
(.0482) 
50
th Percentile of Govrep  .0289 
(.0587) 
  .1613** 
(.0764) 
75
th Percentile of Govrep  .0825* 
(.0437) 
   .1727*** 
(.0527) 
75
th Percentile of Govrep     .1412*** 
(.0524) 
   .2418*** 
(.0683) 
90
th Percentile of Govrep  .0866* 
(.0497) 
   .1790*** 
(.0596) 
90
th Percentile of Govrep     .1636*** 
(.0596) 
   .2578*** 
(.0776)  
Table 6 
Financial Depth and Capital Account Liberalization: 


























           
 
           
       
Estimates of the Effect of KALIB for OECD countries 
 
 
Note: FD denotes the relevant measure of financial depth, LLY or PRIVY. fit KALIB is the fitted value from an OLS regression of 
KALIB on the instrument (see main text for detail). A constant is included in all the regressions. Standard error in parentheses.  
* indicates significance at the 90 percent level of confidence. ** indicates significance at the 95 percent level of confidence.  
*** indicates significance at the 99 percent level of confidence.  
                                                             1986-1995                                                                             1976-1995 
                                                       (1)                    (2)                                                                 (3)                 (4) 
  LLY1990s  PRIVY1990s    LLY1990s  PRIVY1990s 
fit KALIB 95 86-    .1077* 
(.0647) 
  .1307* 
(.0725) 




FD86       .5748*** 
(.0647) 
     .6449*** 
(.0861) 
























Latin America     -.1974*** 
(.0430) 
  -.1438** 
(.0581) 
Oil     -.1393*** 
(.0410) 
    -.1465*** 
(.0462) 
Oil  -.0887* 
(.0504) 
  -.1400** 
(.0689) 








fit KALIB 95 86- * OECD86  .1089 
(.1060) 
   .2488** 
(.1211) 




Obs.  90  90  Obs.  72  72 
Adj. R
2  .82  .81  Adj. R
2  .75  .66 
fit KALIB 95 86-  +
fit KALIB 95 86- *OECD86   .2166** 
(.0841) 
  .3795*** 
 (.0993) 
fit KALIB 95 76- +
fit KALIB 95 76- *OECD86  .2022 
(.1264) 
.4356** 
 (.1740)  
Table 7 
Financial Depth and Capital Account Liberalization: 
Augmented Specification  
 



























Estimates of the Effect of KALIB for OECD countries 
 
       
 
Note: FD denotes the relevant measure of financial depth, LLY or PRIVY. A constant, regional dummies for Africa and Latin 
America, and a dummy for oil producing countries are included in all the regressions. Standard error in parentheses. * indicates 
significance at the 90 percent level of confidence. ** indicates significance at the 95 percent level of confidence. *** indicates 
significance at the 99 percent level of confidence.  
                                                                1986-1995                                                                                  1976-1995 
                                                             (1)                  (2)                                                                        (3)                (4) 
  LLY1990s  PRIVY1990s    LLY1990s  PRIVY1990s 
























































































Obs.   83   83  Obs.   69   69 
Adj. R
2  .87  .85  Adj. R
2  .82  .73 
KALIB86-95 + KALIB86-95*OECD  .1480** 
  (.0703) 
.3563*** 
 (.0786) 
KALIB76-95 + KALIB76-95*OECD  .1890** 
   (.0750) 
  .2845*** 
 (.1037) Table 8 
Simultaneous Equations Estimation of Financial Depth and Growth 
 
 
A. Growth Regression: Dependent Variable is  95 76 ln - D Y  
LLY  PRIVY 
s FD1990         .6244*** 
(.2167) 
s FD1990      .5228** 
(.2262) 
lnY76      -.2662*** 
(.0501) 
lnY76      -.2986*** 
(.0511) 
Trade76  .0006 
(.0008) 
Trade76     .0014** 
(.0007) 
School76       .0073*** 
(.0020) 
School76        .0075*** 
(.0022) 
East Asia        .3084*** 
(.1057) 
East Asia     .2729** 
(.1150) 
Africa      -.3123*** 
(.0879) 
Africa       -.3975*** 
(.0832) 
Pseudo R
2  0.64  Pseudo R
2  0.65 
 
B. Financial Depth Regression: Dependent Variable is  s FD1990  
LLY  PRIVY 
95 76 ln - D Y   .0953 
(.0688) 
95 76 ln - D Y   .0566 
(.1012) 
KALIB76-95       .1205*** 
(.0393) 
KALIB76-95       .2633*** 
(.0572) 
FD76        .5070*** 
(.0789) 
FD76        .6567*** 
(.1143) 
Trade76       .0010*** 
(.0003) 
Trade76  .0001 
(.0005) 
Africa      -.1616*** 
(.0498) 
Africa  -.1165 
 (.0721) 
Latin America      -.1654*** 
(.0379) 
Latin America       -.1760*** 
(.0545) 
Oil     -.0877** 
(.0453) 
Oil    -.1567** 
(.0665) 
Pseudo R
2  0.81  Pseudo R
2  0.71 
       
Observations  70  Observations  70 
Estimation with 3 Stage Least Squares. 